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of liquidity. ln the first case, prudential

rules set out the risks that banks can
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take

a

#

in

relation

to their

capital
requirements. During economic and
financial downturns, losses may
appearthat reduce banks' capital; this

/

*

effect may be amplified by

t

the

accounting rules that require certain
assets to be marked to market. ln
parallel, the risks, often measured on

1.0

lntroduction

services industry around the world
has witnessed remarkable changes,
driven largely bV oeregulation and
liberalization, increasing wave of

globalization and advances in
'nformation and communications
rechnology, resulting in rapid financial

sec'tor development. The
development played an important role
rn srimulating financial innovations;

integration of financial markets and
greater competition among financiai

institutions.

ln

particular, banking

services have greatly improved with

the use of cDmputers,

teiecr:nrmunications and satellite
technologies, and have opened new

avenues

for greater financial

intermediation.

The structurai changes in flnancial
markets have equally expased thern

to various risks and posed several
;hallenges for the supervisory

;rulthorrties and policymakers rn the

,;esign and implementatrcn of
,rlonetary anci flnanciai policies. A
:inancial svstem fhat is in crisis cannot
e isectiire l',' ca i-r,' Out rts ntern':ec i;ti on
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management and corporate

governance best practices. There
have also been episodes of banking
sector distress in Nigeria.

The objective of this paper is to x-ray

the recent banking sector crisis

in

the basis of the credit

during crises, increase and result in

The paper is divided into six main
sections. Following this introduction,

higher capital requirements. The
shortfall of liquidity results when

ln the last few decades, the financial

reforms hinged on proactive risk

Nigeria, its resolution, lessons learned
and way forward.

agencies'
ratings that are regularly downgraded

Charles N. O. Mordi

stage is the post-consolidation era of

markets no longer function correctly
and banks are not sure that they can
obtain financing, they stop lending.

section 2 highlights country
experiences of banking crisis and
resolution options, while section 3

their solvency. 'Ihis may lead to bank

gives an overview ot financial crisrs in
Nigeria. section + discusses the recent
financrai crises in Nigeria (2000
2009), while section 5 presents the
2009 bankrng crises antJ its causes.
The most recent reform measures are

affects the financing of the economy
negatively.

discussed in section 6. ln sections 7
and 8, the lessons of experience and
the way fonvard are presenteo, while
the conciuding remarks are made in

These two conditions could

be

present and be mutually reinforcing.
The build-up of non-performrng loans

:n some institutions casts doubt on

failures and can have systemic
consequences which ultimately

ln Nigeria, the banking sector

had

evolved in five stages. The first stage

was the pre-existence of the Central

Bank

Nigeria ensured rhat only "fit and
proper" persons were granted
tranking license, subject to the
prescribed minimunr paid-r.rp capital
and in line with the orovisions of the
Banking Act. r. he third stage rtras the

post St'r-rcturai Al:justment
Prcqrarnme tSAP) tr r.ie-r:ontroi

r?qtr'|e {1986-2004}, rlLrr.no whrcn ,he
n es- b e ra I p n i crs o r^ h y of ' rr-^ e + r i.-'t''
,vas r)ver-st.etcher: f,:r -tourtl
"ieqa
,v?s tl'e :rl il bank;nC I.'c.ni()iica[iL-ii
f2C04 +;r;'i.,, 't(-:tlij:, 'ruirn ''te;,:,r
rlttr Ljhasts cn i-+ca rrtS!r:;irrt. i-;''g iifiir

inotLrn!ouS r?Ntt'y'et'

2.0

of Nigeria (1930-59), during

which several poorly-capitalized and
unsupervised indigenous financial
institutions, including banks failed in
their infancy. The second stage was
the control regime (1960-1985),
during which the Central Bank of

I t

section 9.

i

:

Jurisdictional Experiences of

Banking Crisis and
Resolution Options

2.1

TheAsiafinancialcrises

Financial crisis is not new. The global
economy has battled with different
financial crises at different times. The

Asian crises, which started in 1997,
spilled to Brazil a yeat later, and
between 1998 and 1999, engulfed the

entire South A,rnerican continent,
causing enormcus economic costs in
of employment and growth
social, ciosure cf corporations and the
Cestruction of the bankrng instittrtions.
The Asian crises, are howerrer. rrniqL;e

ierms
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corresponding growth in factor
productivity, while the absence of

developed financial sector
mechanism to allocate capital
efficiently in affected economies

meant that phenomenal growth rates
would not be sustainable.
The Asian Financial Crisis began in
July 1997 in Thailand following the
collapse of the country's currency, the
Thai baht, along with others in the
region-, Malaysian ringgit, Pilipino

peso, and lndonesian rupiah-as a
result of governments' decision to
float them, by cutting

their

peg to the

United States Dollar in the face of
severe debt problems. Prior to this
period, Asian economies had
attracted substantial inflow of foreign
capital as a result of the sustained
policy of high rates that was meant to
attract foreign investments. However,
domestic financial institutions were

not well prepared to allocate

an

increased inflow of foreign capital.

Consequently, large inflow went to
wrong hands and caused a dramatic

run-up

in asset prices to

an
unsustainable level. The eventual
collapse of asset prices caused
default on debt obligations, while the
resulting panic among lenders led to a
large withdrawal of credit from the
crisis countries, leading to a credit

crunch and further bankruptcies. ln
the mid-1990s, Thailand, lndonesia
and South Korea had large private
current account deficits and the
maintenance of fixed exchange rates

encouraged external borrowing and
led to excessive exposure to foreign
exchange risk in both the financial and
corporate sectors. At the same time,

the U.S. economy recovered from a
recession in the early 1990s, and a
domestic policy to fight inflation
through interest rate hike made the
U.S. economy a more attractive
investmenl. destination relative to
Southeast Asia. For the Southeast
Asian nations which had currencies
pegged to the U.S. dollar, the higher
U.S. dollar caused their own exports
to become more expensive and less
competitive in the global markets.
Thus, as foreign investors attempted
to withdraw their money, the
exchange market was flooded with
the currencies of the crisis countries,
putting pressure on their exchange
rates that in turn caused the further
depreciation of their currencies.

Attempt to prevent currency values
from collapse through high domestic

interest rates policy in order to
diminish flight of capital and foreign
exchange market intervention
became unsustainable; very high
interest rates, which can be extremely

damaging to an economy that is
healthy, caused more problems to
economies already fragile and the
central banks were managing foreign
reseryes that were already limited. lt
soon became clear that the tide of
capital fleeing these countries would
not stop, forcing authorities to cease
defending their fixed exchange rates,
allowing them to float. The resulting
depreciated value of those currencies

meant that foreign currencydenominated liabilities grew
substantially in domestic currency
terms, causing more bankruptcies
and furtherdeepening of the crisis.

2.1.1 Resolution of the crises
Given that the countries affected by
the melt down were among not only
the richest in their region, but in the
world, and since hundreds of billions
of dollars were at stake, any response
to the crisis had to be cooperative and

international. The ltvlF took charge

a series of bailouts
("rescue packages") for the most
affected economies so as to help
them to avoid default, tying the
packages to reforms that were
intended to restore Asian currency,
and to make bankrng and financial
systems as much like those of the
and created

United States and Europe

as

possible. ln other words, the IMF's
support was conditional on a series of
drastic economic reforms influenced
by neoliberal economic principlesthe
"structural adjustment package"
(SAP). The SAPs called on crisrs-

to cut back on
to reduce
deficits, allowing insolvent banks and
financial institutions to fail, and
struck nations

government spending

aggredsively raise interest rates. The
reasonin-g was that these steps would
restore confidence in the nations'
fiscal solvency, penalize insolvent
companies, and protect currency
values. Above all, it was stipulated

that IMF-funded capital had to be
administered rationally in the future,

with no favored parties

receiving
funds blr preference. There were to be
adequate government controls set up
to supervise all financial activities,
onOs that were to be independent, in
34

theory, of private interest. lnsolvent

institutions had to be closed, and
insolvency itself had to be clearly
defined. ln short, exactly the same
kinds of financial institutions found in
the United States and Europe had to
be created in Asia, as a condition for
IMF support. ln addition, financial
systems had to become "transparent"

that is; provide the kind of reliable
financial information used in the West
to make sound financialdecisions.

However, the greatest criticism of the
IMF's role in the crisis was targeted
towards its response. As country after

country fell into crisis, many local
businesses and governments that
had taken out loans in US dollars,
which suddenly became much more
expensive relative to the local
currency that formed their earned
income, found themselves unable to
pay their creditors. The dynamics of
the situation were closely similar to
that of the Latin American debt crisis.
The effects of the SAPs were mixed
and their impact controversial. Critics,

however, noted the contractionary
nature of these policies, arguing that
in a recession, the traditional
Keynesian response was to increase
government spending, prop up major
companies, and lower interest rates.
The reasoning was that by stimulating

the economy and staving

off

recession, governments could

restore confidence while preventing
economic loss. They pointed out that
the U.S. government had pursued
expansionary polrcies, such as
lowering interest rates, increasing
government spending, and cutting
taxes, when the United States itself

entered a recession in 2001, and
arguably the same rn the fiscal and
monetary policies during the
20082009 Global Financial Crisis
Why similar measures were not
implemented for the south EastAsian
countries is ditficult to explain.

2.1.2

Lessons
One lesson from these crises rs that

countries with high reserves are
better able to withstand financial
cnses caused by a sudden currency

reversal. The issue of transparency is
not new either; more information must
be made available, and utilized
properly. Another lesson taken from

the crises has to do with

the

composition of capital flows and their

Volume 34, No. 3
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duration; short-term investment is
more likely to respond to a shock than
those on a longer term. Furthermore,
given that financial and economic
crises are likely to hit countries at
different regions at the same time, a

greater role should be ascribed to
governments in the domestic financial
system.

is a temptation to
conclude that IMF programs cause

While there

moral hazard, domestic practices are

crucial. The financial and corporate
sectors when poorly supervised can
still constitute a problem even where
domestic macroeconomic policy is
credible.

2.2.

Turkish banking crisis
Over the past 30 years, Turkey has

been governed by 22 successive

governments, and macroeconomic
and political instability became a
major feature of the country. Populist
macroeconomic policies, moral
hazard problems, huge public sector

deficits, high real interest rates,
overvalued Turkish lira, strong
currency substitution, large current
account deficits, volatile short-term
international capital flows, extremely
risk taking behavior of banks, volatile
economic growth, and high and
persistent inflation resulted in several

successive crises

in the real

and

financial sectors in Turkey.

The financial sector in Turkey

is

traditionally dominated by banking
activities, and the banking sector
experienced several systemic crises
since late 1970s. ln early 1980, in
response to a strong balance-ofpayments crisis accompanied by a
deep recession and accelerated
inflation, Turkey abandoned its

inward-oriented development
strategy and gradually started to

introduce free-market based reforms.
To liberalize the repressed domestic
financial system, many restrictions on

domestic and external financial
intermediation processes were
removed, or at least minimized,
between 1980and 1989.

The Turkish Banking Sector (TBS)
went through major consolidation
during 1 999-2003 in the aftermath of a

failed disinflation

programme
(December 1999February 2001), a
devastating financial crisis and a

about the recovery. ln early 2004,
relative macroeconomic stability
appeared to have been achieved, and

having gone through the worst, the

sector appeared set for the next
phase of consolidation and groMh.
One broad conclusion that follows
was that the sector had gone through

much rehabilitation and recovery
it was, the
banking environment was then
improved and had a first-class

already, and painful as

Unlike most other countries, Turkey
had no need for bank bailouts; not one

Turkish bank lost money, and during
the course of 2009 the banking sector
was back in the business of making
good money with a return on equity of
some 19 percent. That was impressive
compared with the banking sectors of
several EU member states. The
reason why Turkish banks survived

the storm was predominantly due to
strict flscal reforms that were carried

regulatory framework. Banks were
this
profitability was largely based on the

out during the domestic financial crisis

large share of treasury-bill holdings in
banks' portfolios and a spectacular,
but arguably one-off rally in yields,
while the contribution of true banking
activities to profits remained low. The

Turkey's economic future also looks

very profitable in 2003, but

sector suffered from chronic

of2000 -2001.
quite rosy and the country is emerging
quite strongly from the crisis. lndeed,
the lnternational Monetary Fund
predicts that Turkey's economy is set
to grow by up to 11 percent.

macroeconomic instability, heavy
taxation and a weak loan portfolio.

2.2.1. Recent banking Crisis

in

Turkey

Turkish's recent predicament was
equally triggered by the US subprime
crisis, which spread across the globe
and large European banks. The toxic
loans or assets affected the balance
sheet of developing nations, including

Furthermore, another positive sign for
Turkey's emerging economy is that
GDP is ahead of target, which is also
remarkable. ln addition, in the first few
months of 2010, the nationaldeficitfell
40 percent for the year. This progress
was possible because the government
realized early on that the country was

Turkey. Turkey weathered the

in economic shock and devised a
game plan consisting of creating a
gradual decline of deficit in GDP by 3

financial crisis far better than many

percent by 201 2.

other countries, including a significant
number of European Union member
states. As a result, Turkey has
become a more integrated and bigger
player in the global economy, with a
strong emerging economy making it
one of only a few countries with postcrisis potential.
Turkey has learned from the financial

catastrophes of the past and
accustomed to financial crises and
the recessions that usually follow
them, with the recent global financial
crisis being the fifth to hit the country
in the last 30 years. However, Turkey
was better prepared this time and
managed to stay afloat as a result of
its strong financial foundations, after
making good progress in the financial
in recent years with an
increase of gross domestic product

sector

in 2002 lo
just
billion
before
the crisis.
$740
Clearly the financial crisis rocked this
growth, which led to a 4.7 percent
decrease. But the last few quarters
have shown a strong comeback, and
Turkey is wellon the road to recovery.
(GDP) from $230 billion

renewed IMF programme that brought
35

The lesson from above is the need for
proactive strengthening of the banking
system that could withstand shocks as
intense as the recent global financial
crisis.

3.0

Overview of Financial Crises
in Nigeria
There have been various episodes of
banking crisis in Nigeria. Since

commercial banking business
commenced in 1892, the Nigerian
banking system has witnessed
episodes of crisis. The first took place
in late 1930s and early 1950s, mainly
as a result of lack of regulation,

inadequate capital, fraudulent
practices and bad management

(Okigbo 1981). Consequently, about
21 of the 25 indigenous banks which
had been established by 1954 failed.

The failures were resolved mainly
through self-liquidation. The outcome
was a bitter experience, especially for

depositors who lost their money.
However, the introduction of the
Banking Ordinance of 1952, the
establishment of the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) in 1959, and the

July - September 2010
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promulgation of the banking Act of
1969, appeared to have brought in

some sanity in the Nigeria banking
system.

Systemic crisis re-surfaced in the
Nigerian banking industry between
1989 and 1998, and pockets of the
crisis syndrome have been
experienced by some banks ever
since. The crisis of 1989 was
attributable to the withdrawal of public
sector deposits from banks. This

singular act exposed the weak
financial condition of most financial
institutions. The situation was,
generally, the visible manifestation of
a complex set of interrelated
problems, including a weak policy
environment (over-regulation), capital
and management inadequacies, and
economic downturn, the negative
effects of deregulation, and political
interference.

resolved through mergers and
acquisition.'One of the 'most recent
episodes of crises in the banking
sectorwas in 2009 when, eight banks
out of the 24 banks in operation were
in grave condition and the problem is

Merchant Bank (FMB), Kapital
Merchant Bank (KMB), Alpha
Merchant Bank (AMB), United
Commercial Bank (UCB), Republic
Bank (RBL), CCB, PBN, Mercantile
Banketc.

still lingering till date.

A range of options are known to be
available for resolving banking
system crises in the literature. At one
extreme, a bank can be kept open
through an injection of capital. At the
other extreme, a bank can be closed
with its assets sold and depositors
and possibly other creditors paid off.
Between these extremes, a bank's
licence may be removed but with the
bank sold off to another bank, in full or
part, to preserve the bank's activities.
of involvement of the

The extent

Purchase and Assumptlon (P&A)
Model
The basic characteristics of this
option is the purchase of the whole or
part (cherry-picking) of the assets of a
failed bank by a healthy (assuming)
bank and the assumption of the
deposit liabilities of the failed bank by
the same bank. The P&A Option has
featured prominently in the history of
bank failure resolution in Nigeria.
Following the conclusion of the bank

consolidation exercise

at

end-

private sector support, or extended to
official fi nancial support, government

December 2005, 13 banks that failed
to make it were handed over to the
NDIC for liquidation. The P&A model
had since been adopted by the
Corporation for their liquidation. As at

end-December2009,

authorities may also vary. lt may be
limited to encouraging or organising

Most of Nigeria's state-owned banks

takeover. When a bank is financially

became insolvent because they
carried heavy bad debt and high

distressed there should be
preference, first, to encourage

a
a

affected banks had been assumed by
some healthy banks. These include

overhead costs. Untilthe late 1980's,
been
concealed by a combination of factors
including public subsidy and an
improper accounting system. Since

an
unassisted private sector solution
cannot be found, a decision would
next be made about whether to
liquidate the bank or provide some
form of government assistance. ln
exceptional circumstances, if there
were a systemic threat, governments
might consider a takeover or
guarantee to a failed bank, as an

Allstate, Hallmark (assumed by Eco
bank); trade, Metropolitan, City
Express, African Express, Gulf,

interim measure.

CBN Bail-out Using Guarantees
This option was applied by the CBN
during the late 1990s for some of the

their financial fragility had

that date, however, enforcement of
stricter prudential standard and less
accommodating stance toward
liquidi$ support have exposed the
weakness of bank's balance sheets.
The deregulation of the banking
system, especially with regard to
interest rates, and relaxation of entry

requirements

in the

mid-1980s
facilitated a dramatic increase in the
number of Nigeria commercial and
merchant banks. lt also exposed the
banks to intense competition for
which many of them were ill-prepared.

Some of the banks attracted a
significant market share through
improved customer services at
competitive prices. ln contrast, many
banks appeared to have been set up

largely to take advantage of arbitrage
opportunities in the foreign exchange
market, ratherthan to undertake more

conventional banking business.

private sector solution. lf

ln Nigeria, so far, four broad types of
resolution options have been used by
the regulatory/supervisory authorities
in resolving banking crisis. These are
discussed asfollows:

Outright Liquidation (deposit payout):
Under this option, the entire assets
and liabilities of the affeeted bank are
placed under the control of the
liquidator (NDIC) who would arrange
to physically close the bank. NDIC
then verifies the assets and liabilities
of the bank and exercises control over

all its

moveable assets. Under

Furthermore, bad management and
fraud, including insider lending, were
endemic and led to widespread

Nigeria's deposit insurance scheme,
each customer's account is insured
up to a maximum N200.0 (two
hundred thousand naira). ln 1998, 26

1990s, over thirty-three banks were
distressed in Nigeria and a number of

banks with 347 branches spread over
32 states and Abuja were closed
down and put in liquidation under the
NDIC. Some of them were Financial

distress among them.

ln the late

them were handed to the NDIC for
outright liquidation, while others were

36

11

outofthe

13

Liberty (assumed by UBA); Lead,
Assurance (assumed by Afribank);
and Eagle (assumed by Zenith). The
cases of Triumph and Fortune

lnternational banks are still pending in
the court.

ailing banks. For instance, at the
inauguration of one of the affected
bank's new board and management,
the CBN gave a commitment that it
was fully behind the bank and would
honour all cheques drawn on it.
Further guarantees were given to
other healthy banks, which enabled
those banks to provide life-boat

to the affected banks.
Unfortunately, this option did not stop
the run on these banks,
facilities

CBN/NDIC Controlled
Restructuring (Open bank
assisfance,)

This option implies taking over the
board and management of a bank by

the CBN and NDIC in order to
restructure the bank and run it
profitably. This option is anchored on

the hope that the cream of
professionals selected jointly by the

Volume 34, No.3
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CBN and NDIC would be able to tum
the bank around within a short period
of time and return the bank to the
owners. This was variously used by

the Bank in the late 1990s

and

recently when about eight (8) banks

had problems. ln most cases, this
option worked out as some of the
affected banks were resuscitated,
while in other cases the resuscitation
efforts proved abortive. ln most of the
failed cases, the banks had forwarded

falsified financial reports

to

the

regulatory authorities to cover up its

fraudulent practices which were
already beyond redemption.

4.0

The Recent Financial Sector
Grises in Nigeria

The liberalization of the

financial
services sector in 1986 encouraged
the establishment of many financial
institutions, particularly banks. The

reforms produced unintended

outcomes including, inefficient, riskier
and illiquid banks that generated
lower return on assets relative to the

pre-reform period (Sobodu and

Akiode, 1994). The incidence of fraud

and of non-performing loans also
increased with the reforms as
revealed by a CBN/NDIC study of
Distress in the financial system. The

quality of management, a major
determinant of banks' long-term
survival (Siems 1992; Pentalone and
Platt 1987) and the dearth of qualified

personnel to meet the challenges of
sudden astronomical grovtrth in the
industry contributed to the poor health

of the banking industry (lkhide and
Alawode 1994).

industry was dominated by the top 20
30 banks, with 69 banks out of the 89
licensed banks operating as marginal
players, while about 60 70 per cent of
total deposits were short-term (30 90
days), which was why banks were not
lending to the real sector. Other
features of the industry included

extension of barely 3 5 per cent of
total banks' credit to agriculture and
manufacturing sectors; and 89 banks

and risk-based supervision.

progress in implementation was slow.

savings by offering reasonable
interest rate to small depositors.

Savings deposit rate averaged 3 5
per cent; while lending rate averaged

21-32percent.
A number of the banks examined had

revealed severe weaknesses,

including weak corporate
by high
turnover in the Board and
management staff , inaccurate
governance, evidenced

regulatory requirements, falling ethics

and de-marketing of other banks in
the industry; gross insider abuses,
resulting in huge non-performing
insider related credits. Other
indicators were late or nonpublication of annual accounts that
obviates the impact of market
discipline in ensuring banking
soundness; insolvency, as evidenced
by negative capital adequacy ratios

and complete erosion of

comprehensive reform agenda.

Furthermore, a

the 2004

surveillance report by the CBN as at

Consequently,

end-March 2004 indicated that 62
banks out of 89 were classified as
sound/ satisfactory, 14 as marginal,
while the position of unsound banks
had deteriorated from 9 at endDecember 2003 to 11. The report
further indicated that 2 of the banks
failed to render statutory returns

consolidation was focused on further
liberalization of banking business;
ensuring competition and safety of the
system; and proactively positioning

bank

the industry to perform the role of

Furthermore, an assessment of the

intermediation and playing a catalytic
role in economic development. The
exercise led to the reduction of banks
from 89 to 24 banks with a substantial
increase in capital. Many banks
raised significant capital following the

structure

consolidation exercise. Financial

industry at endDecember 2003, revealed that the

of the

5.0

But

The 2009 Banking Grises in
Nigeria and its Gauses

The advent of the global financial
crisis, however, strained the
consolidated gains made in the sector.

The immediate impact of

global
financial turbulence on the banking
system was, however, contained.
While offshore funding of the domestic
banking system was growing before
the crisis, its scale was manageable
and the central bank was able to

accommodate commercial banks
foreign exchange demand in the depth
of the globalcrisis.

reporting and non-compliance with

role of enhancing the growth process

during the period.

capital. The central bank recognized
the need for strengthened supervision
and developed a plan for consolidated

$18.0 billion, compared with 58 banks
in South Africa, with a total asset of
$146 billion. Also, over N373.1 billion
was outside the banking system due
to the failure of banks to mobilize

needed to be addressed urgently to
enable them perform their catalytic

in the economy.

and secure a return on their expanded

in operation having a total assets of

shareholders' funds by operating
Iosses; over-dependence on public
sector deposits, and neglect of small
and medium class savers. Thus, the
condition of the banking industry
necessitated the articulation of a

From the foregoing, it could be seen
that the Nigerian banking system
faced enormous challenges which

Bank branches grew ftom 2,900 in
2005 to almost 5,5O0 in mid-2009.
Banks participated in a wider range of
activities, including financing of
infrastructure and the oilsector, which
previously had been out of reach.
Banks were under pressure to deploy

intermediation increased significantly.
37

Subsequently, the industry experience
in the face of the global meltdown was,

however, consistent with global
trends. The crises impacted the
economy through various channels: significant decline in oil revenue
leading to revenue attrition for all tiers

of

government; reduced capital

inflows in the economy; depletion of
external/foreign reserves; demand

pressure in the foreign exchange
market; substantial decline in stock
market capitalization and share
prices; huge bank losses on margin

loans and share-backed facilities; low
valuation with many banks trading
below book value; declining asset
values; and declining credit growthcredit crunch and slowdown of output
growth. A section of the banking
industry was badly affected and
liquidity problem was precipitated
following its significant exposure to the
capital market in form of margin
trading loans. The industry's exposure

to the capital market in the form of
margin trading facilities granted to
market operators/investors stood at
about N900.0 billion as at endDecember, 2008. The amount
represented about 12.0 per cent of
aggregate credit of the industry or
per cent of shareholders'funds.
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Again, in the wake of the high oil
prices, a section of the industry was
badly exposed to the oil and gas
sector. As at end-December, 2008,
banks' total exposure to the oil
industry stood at over N754.0 billion,
representing over 10.0 per cent of the
industry total and over 27.0 per cent of
the shareholders' funds.

increased, banks were able to
increase their lending, facilitated
more by the impact of the
consolidation in the domestic banking
sector that brought caused increased
capital in the banks. Consequently,
bank deposits and credit, tracking the
price of oil, grewfour-fold from 2004to

2009 and banking assets grew on
average at 76% per annum since

These excessive exposures resulted

consolidation.

problems) exhibited by some of the
banks towards the end of 2008. As
part of its liquidity support, the CBN

lndeed, the economy was not able to
absorb of the excess liquidity from oil

(EDW) in October 2008 to
accommodate money market
instruments such as Bankers'
Acceptances and Commercial

significant flows to non-priority
sectors and to the capital markets,

in the weaknesses

(liquidity

Discount Window was expanded

Papers.

As at June 2009, the banks' total
commitments under the EDW was
over N2, 688.84 billion, while the

revenues and foreign investments in
productive sectors. This resulted in
mostly in the form of margin loans and
proprietary trading camouflaged as

loans. As a result, market

capitalization of the NSE increased
5.3 times between 2004 and its peak
in 2007, and the market capitalization

of bank stocks increased 9

times

during the same period. This set the

N256.0 billion, most of which was
owed by less than half of the banks in
operation. When the CBN closed
down the EDW and, in its place,
guaranteed inter-bank placements, it
was observed that the same number
of banks were the main net-takers
under the guarantee arrangement,
indicating thatthey had a deep-rooted
liquidity problem. Domestic factors
and the global crisis had triggered
significant problems in the banking

stage for

system. The financial stability
be

strengthened.
lnternally, the financial system was hit
interdependent

by Eight (8) main

factors that led to the creation of an
extremely fragile financial system.

a financial asset bubble
particularly in bank stocks. The rapid

rise in asset prices and the over
concentration of bank shares in the
stock market index were clear
indications of a potential financial
crisis. ln 2007, the Nigerian Stock
Exchange was "the best performing"
bourse in the world even though there

was no evidence

to

suggest a
in the

commensurate improvement

development and caused
tremendous instability as

it rise to

in the
banking system. Simultaneously, the

volatile liquidity regimes

lack of an effective fiscal quarantining

mechanism meant that the fiscal
authorities would fail to prevent this
excess liquidity from reaching the
domestic banking system. Banking
system liquidity closely mirrored
international oil price volatility. As
amounts held in Nigerian deposits

independence; directors often failed

to make meaningful contributions to
safeguard the growth and
development of the bank and had
weak ethical standards; the board
committees were also often
ineffective or dormant. CBN had
published details of the extent of

Lack of investor and consumer
sophistication
A lack of investor and consumer
sophistication also contributed to the
crisis by failing to impose market
discipline and allowing banks to take
advantage of consumers. lnvestors,
many newto investing, were unaware

of the risks they were taking

and

consumers were often subjected to
poor service and sometimes hidden
fees.

Nigeria does not have a tradition of

consumer activism or investor
protection and as a consequence
many Nigerians maiJe investments

without a proper understanding of the
risks. Limited consumer protection

framework did exist in Nigeria.
However, the framework was
inadequate and as a result
consumers' rights were not
sufiiciently protected.

fundamentals of real sector economy.

CBN's macro-prudential

management did not sufficiently
address the impact of these oilrelated inflows, and with the fiscal
policy being pro-cyclical, this
exacerbated the crisis.

Poor corporate governance at
banks

Sudden capital inflows and Macroeconomic instability
Volatility in monthly disbursement of
oil revenues made it difficult for
governments to manage economic

board, and some boards lacked

insiderabuse in severalof the banks.

outstanding commitments was over

framework needed to

The bank chairman/CEO often had
an overbearing influence on the

Corporate govemance in many banks

failed because boards ignored

significant unethical practices in
banks as they were misled by
executive management, and in some

instances participated themselves in
obtaining un-secured loans, as well
as not having the qualifications to
enforce good governance and

process management on bank. ln
addition, the audit process at all banks
appeared not to have taken fully into
account the rapid deterioration of the
economy and hence of the need for
aggressive provisioning against risk
assets.

38

lnadequate Disclosure and lack of
transparency
lnadequate disclosure by the banks
was another major contributing factor
to the crisis. Bank reports to the CBN

and investors often were inaccurate,
incomplete and late, depriving the

CBN of the right information to
effectively supervise the industry and
depriving investors of information
required making informed investment
decisions. ln addition, banks made
public information on their operations
on a highly selective basis and

investors were unable to make
informed decisions on the quality of
bank earnings, the strength of their
balance sheets or the risks in their
businesses. Without accurate
information, investors made illadvised decisions regarding bank
stocks, enticed by speculative market
bubble, which was partly fuelled by

the banks through the practice of
margin lending.
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Moreover, some banks even engaged
manipulating their books by
colluding with other banks to artificially
enhance financial positions and
therefore stock prices. Practices such

in

as conversion of

non-performing

loans into commercial papers and

bank acceptances and setting up off-

balance sheet special purpose
vehicles to hide losses were
prevalent. Recently the CBN put an

end to these practices and the
collapse of the equity markets
effectively put an end to stock price
manipulation.

Critical gaps in regulatory
Lack of co-ordination among
regulators was one reason the CBN
did not have a comprehensive

framework and regulations

consolidated bank view of banks'
activities. ln addition, regulations on
the major causes of the crisis were
often incomplete. There is little coordination among the financial service
regulators. ln spite of the widespread

knowledge of bank malpractice and

propensity for regulatory arbitrage,
the Financial Services Regulatory
Coordinating Committee (FSRCC),
the coordinating body for financial
regulators did not meet for two years
during this time. Whilst excess capital
gave rise to strong groMh in lending,
banks were also allowed to use the
capital to enter many other nonlending activities such as stock market
investments, most of which were
hived off to subsidiaries thus escaping
supervisory scrutiny by the CBN. The
CBN did not receive examination
reports from the SEC covering bank

subsidiaries, nor was there

framework

for consolidated

a

bank

examination.
A comparison of Nigerian regulations
with those of international regulators

indicated the Nigerian set of
regulations was not as
comprehensive. An example was the

lack of a legal and regulatory
framework governing the margin
lending activity.

Uneven supervision and
enforcement
Uneven supervision and inadequate
enforcement also played a significant
role in exacerbating the problems
associated with the crisis. Regulators

were ineffective in foreseeing and
supervising the massive changes in

the industry or in eliminating

the

and 12 months, follow-up

on

pervasive corporate governance

examination recommendations rolled

failures.

into the following year's examination.

The Supervision Department within
the CBN was not structured to
supervise effectively and to enforce
regulation. No one was held
accountable for addressing the key
industry issues such as risk

There was insufficient discipline in
holding the banks to clear remedial

management, corporate governance,

fraud, money laundering, crossre g u la to ry co-o rd in atio n,
enforcement, legal prosecution or for

ensuring examination policies and
procedures were well adapted to the
prevailing environment. Moreover,
the geographic separotion of on-site
and off-site examiners hindered the
building of integrated and effective

supervisory teams. Critical

processes, like enforcement, preexamination planning and people
development were not delivering the

results required to effectively
supervise and engage banks to
enforce good conduct.

There were many instances of
weaknesses in the supervision and
enforcement process. For example,

bank examinations were not
conducted on a bank consolidated

programmes. While banks responded

to examination reports, they seldom
committed to specific deliverables,
timing or executive responsibility for
implementation. Hence it was difficult
against
compliance with some of the major

to measure bank progress
reco

mmend

atio n s.

Bank

s'

eompliance record was poor. They
frequently ignored the examiners
recommendations in spite of the
senousness of the issues. The
consequence to the banks of
noncompliance Was not sufficient to
change behavior. Directors faced no
personal consequences for noncompliance.

Weaknesses within the CBN
Governance and internal processes

were unstructured and this

compromised the CBN's ability to
supervise the industry. Corporate
governance at the CBN was laissez-

faire and there were

inadequate

committee structures and processes

to ensure ttie CBN

Board's

basis. Pre-examination planning did

independence in assessing whether

the
Expanded Discount Window nor did it
include a review of prior SEC or
NAICOM reports (if any) on bank
subsidiaries. ln addition, the CBN did

the CBN was fulfilling its mission.

not question banks' use of

not provide input to the SEC in
planning its examinations of bank

The CBN was not organized to monitor

adequately and analyze the
macroeconomic issues and systemic
risks inherent.in the financial sector.

There was no overarching

activities. Also, the ratings and depth
of analysis wasn't sufficient to capture
the issues. For example, CAMEL

architecture to manage the risks in the
banking system, linking economic

performance of successful and failed
banks. While some examinations
identified critical risk management
issues, many issues that caused the
crisis escaped examination, though
they were well known in the industry.
Sense of urgency was low with some

prudential guidelines. As

ratings did not differentiate the

examinations taking between I
months to more than a year to
complete Enforcement was the
biggest failure among surveillance

indicatdrs

to

guidelines and

macro-prudential
individual bank

to

a

consequence, managing the risks in
the banking system from the impact of
oil price volatility, cross-border capital
flows, asset price bubbles and weak
corporate governance did not have the

necessary urgency within the CBN
itself. Management information to
analyze the risks in the banking
system was inefficient. There were
also data quality issues, which

processes, despite the CBN having all

negatively affected the CBN's internal
reporting system.

Financial penalties are inadequate to

Weaknesses

enforce bank compliance. By payrqg
fines, banks effectively annulled key
aspects of the examination reports.
With examination cycles between 6

environment

the powers it needed to enforce
examination recommendations.

39

in the

business

A lack of a sufiiciently developed
infrastructure and business
environment has had

a

negative
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influence on the banking industry. The
legal process, an absence of reliable

credit rating agencies and poor
infrastructure all contributed to nonstandard banking practices.

'

Nigeria's legal process is long and
expensive and banks seldom pursue
borrowers in court. Few banks were

able to foreclose on borrowers, and

this led to borrowers abusing the
system. Basic lack of credit

information on customers, largely
because there is no uniform way to
identify customers, has held back the

development of credit bureaus and

hampered customer credit

ln that regard, the CBN replaced the
chief executives/executive directors
of the banks identified as the source of
instability in the industry and injected

the sum of N620.0 billion into the
banks in an effort to prevent a

systemic banking crisis. The injection
of this fund (Tier ll capital) into these
banks is considered sufficient to

factors acting in concert brought the
entire Nigerian financial system to the
brinkof collapse.

6.0

The Recent Reform Measures

The global financial crisis strained the

progress made in the sector. The
industry experience in the face of the

global meltdown is, however,
consistent with global trends.
Specifically, a section of the banking

industry was badly affected and
liquidity problem was precipitated
following its signiflcant exposure to
the capital market in form of margin
trading loans. Again, in the wake of
the high oil prices, a section of the
industry was badly exposed to the oil
excessive

and gas sector. These

exposures resulted in the

weaknesses (liquidity problems)
exhibited by some of the banks
towards the end of 2008.

A joint special examination
(CBN/NDIC) of 10 out of the 24 banks
as at May 31, 2009 revealed that
some of the banks exhibited the
following symptoms:

o
r

Substantial non-performing
loan;

Poor corporate governance
(weaknesses

r
o

in

governance

debtors while guaranteeing all foreign
credits and correspondent banking
commitments of the five banks.

time

actions, if necessary.

As additional measure to strengthen
the reform process, the CBN
commenced the creation of Asset
Management Corporation. The
Assets Management Corporation.of
Nigeria (AMCON) has already been
passed into law by the National
Assembly and signed into law by the

confidence in the banking system and
enhance customer protection, the
CBN established the Consumer and
Financial Protection Division to
provide a platform through which
consumers can seek redress. ln the
first three months of its operation,
about 600 consumer complaints were
received by the Division which was a

President. The AMCON

as

a

resolution vehicle is expected to soak

the toxic assets of the

to

ensure timely regulatory

To further engender public

manifestation of the absence of an

effective consumer complaints

intervened banks and provide liquidity

resolution mechanism in banks. The
CBN has also issued a directive to

to them as well as assist in

their

capitalization.

Furthermore, the Bank. in
collaboration with the fiscal
authorities is improving the
macroeconomic environment so as to

achieve robust monetary

and

banks to establish Customer Help
Desks at their head offices . and
branches. ln addition, the CBN has
commenced a comprehensive review
of the Guide to Bank Charges with a
view to making the charges rea[istic
and consumer friendly. Furthermore,

financial policies in particular and, the

the Consumer and

overall macroeconomic objectives of
the government, in general. ln this
regard, the Bank is collaborating with

Protection Division

the Federal Government to raise
N500.00 billion for power/

Financial

is expected io
commence a programme of

consumer education and

enlightenment and is also
collaborating with the Consumer

infrastructure development. This. is

Protection Council on the review of

expected

the Consumer Protection Council Act
No. 66 of 1992 to regulators to
enforce discipline in the market.

to

provide favorable

environment that would encourage
operators in the industry. ln addition,
N200.00 billion has recently been
provided wholly by the CBN for SMEs
financing.

It is also collaborating with the
Securities and Exchange

adequacy; and

Commission (SEC) and the Nigerian

illiquidity problem

Stock Exchange (NSE)to reduce the
cost of transactions, particularly bond
issues so as to diversify funding
sources away from banks as well as
attract more foreign portfolio investors
into the sector. Efforts are also being

depositors and creditors, and restore
public confidence and safeguard the
integrity of the Nigerian banking
industry.

are being deployed to any bank at any

CBN-

Weaknesses in capital

It was against this background that
to
strengthen the industry, protect

unethical banking practice, and

greater emphasis on enforcement of
Code of Corporate Governance.
Standby teams of target examiners

and management;)

the CBN moved decisively

tolerance on all unprofessional and

resolve and stabilize them and'to
enable them to continue normal
business operations. Arrangements
have been made to recover nonperforming loans from the banks'

assessment at banks, increasing the
stock of bad debt in the system. These

operations of the Deposit
Money Banks (DMBs) to ensure that
they remain safe, sound and healthy.
ln addition, these efforts will also
ensure the sustenance of public
confidence through the enforcement
of appropriate disclosures and
reinvigorating the policy of zero

of the

The CBN has taken steps to integrate
the banking system into the global
best practices in financial reporting
and disclosure through the adoption

of the lnternational

Financial

Reporting Standards (IFRS)

in

the

Nigerian Banking Sector by end
2010. This is expected to enhance
market discipline, and reduce
uncertainties which limit the risk of
unwarranted contagion. The CBN is
also, closely collaborating with other

like the

intensified towards strengthening

stakeholders

framework and enhancing monitoring

Accounting Standard Board (NASB),
Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF),

regulatory and supervisory
40
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NDIC, SEC, and NAICOM;PENCOM,

Federal lnland Revenue Service
(FIRS), and lnstitute of Chartered
Accountant of Nigeria (ICAN), among
others, towards ensuring a seamless
adoption of IFRS in the Nigerian
banking sector by 2012. These efforts
are peing pursued under the aegis of

the. Roadmap Committee of
Stakeholders on theAdoption of IFRS
in Nigeria inaugurated by the NASB
and facilitated by the World Bank.

general and the banking sector in
particular in the next ten years. The
blue print, christened "The Alpha
Project lnitiatives of the CBN" is built
on.4 pillars of enhancing the quality of
banks, establishing financial stability,
enabling healthy financial sector
evolution and ensuring that financial
sector contributes to the real
economy.

Enhancing the quality of banks

was deployed in multiples of financial

The CBN would initiate a five-part
pr"ogramme, to enhance the
operations and quality of banks in
Nigeria, which would consist of
industry remedial programmes to fix
the key causes of the crisis,
implementation of risk based
supervision, reforms to regulations

services.

and regulatory framework, enhanced

The universal banking (UB) model
adopted in 2001, allowed banks to
diversify into non-bank financial
businesses. Following the
consolidation - programme, banks
became awash with capital, which

ln

effect, the laudable
of the UB Model were
abused by operators with banks
objectives

operating as financial supermarkets to

the detriment of core

UB Model with a view to directing
banks to focus on core banking
business. Under the new model,

banks would not be allowed to invest
in non-bank subsidiaries, while banks

with such investments would

be

required to either divest or spin-off the
businesses to holding companies that
will be,licensed by the CBN as other

financial instituiions-. The three
classes of deposit money banks being
proposed are: lnternational banks,
National banks, and Regional banks.

Other measures included: the
strengthening of institutional
coordination through the Financial
Service Regulation Coordinating
Committee (FSRCC), adoption of
common accounting year end for all

banks, aimed

at

condgcting own-risk assessments
and relying less on classifications by
rating,agencies; limiting the tenor of

Chief Executives of Banks to 10
years;; sound and timely regulation
and supervision of the financial sector;

stringent demand for transparency in
the financial sector; and transparency
in structured credit instruments to be

improved upon for easy assessment
of associated risk.

The Central Bank of Nigeria has also
articulated a blue print for reforming

the Nigerian financial system

in

contributes to the real economy. The
CBN would take the lead in measuring

more accurately the relationship
between the real economy and
financialsector, as well as cooperating
with state governments to run pilot
programmes in directing the financial

sector's contribution to social and
economic development within the
states.

Furthermore, the CBN intends to be
announcing an advance calendar of its
operations for each week so that

market expectations are formed in a

manner that

is

conducive

to

the

realization of the objectives of policy.
The Bank also proposes to have in

place firm consultation procedures
with bank executives prior to and after
the policy meetings as a condition for

Establishing Financial Stability
This would centre on strengthening
the Financial Stability Committee
within the CBN and establishing a
hybrid monetary policy and macroprudential rules. lt would also include
the development of directional
ecbnomic policy and counter-cyclical
fiscal policies by the government and

financial services sector live up to the

further development of capital market
as altemative to bank funding. Some
of the potential levers for the new
macro-prudential rules may include

timiting capital market lending to a
ploportion of a bank's balance sheet,

prohibiting banks from using
Qepositors' funds for proprietary
trading, private equity or venture
capital investment, adjusting capital

bringing about a more open and
transparent monetary policy. The
CBN is putting in place a code of
conduct for regulators to ensure that
regulatory and supervisory staff in the

high expectation, thereby reducing
various types of risks in both their
domestic and international operations.

7.0

Lessons

of

Experience for

Nigeria

A number of lessons of experience
have emanated from the various
reforms in the financial services sector

since 1986, particularly the recentl
financial crisis. This requires that new

strategies would have to be
conceptualized and articulated to
address the increasingly complex

adequacy and forward looking capital
requirement driven by stress tests by
tne CeN.

of the major lessons of experience for
Nigeria include the following:

Enabling healthy Financial Sector
Fuolution

Orientation

The CBN would review the basic onesize-fits-all model of bank regulation
in addition to reviewing the universal

ln order to remain relevant as financial
intermediaries, financial institutions in
the country would need to be sensitive

improving data

integrity and comparability;

President on Economic Matters to
ensure that the financial sector

provision for consumer protection and
internal transformation of the CBN
which hascommenced.

banking

practices. To address the observed
challenges, the CBN is reviewing the

CBN Governor's role as Adviser to the

banking model mandates which
would make it possible to have
international, national, regional,
monoline and specialized banks such
as lslamic banks, etc, with different
capital requirements, commensurate
to the depth of their activities.

Ensuring the Financial Sector
Contributes to the Real Economy
This would entail leveraging on the

issues in the sector. Specifically, some

lncreased Gustomer Focus and

to

customer needs for greater
efficiency and convenience.

Customers' expectations have taken a
in the new global

quantum leap

financial landscape. Financial
services no longer involve providing
only standard products to customers.
The need for financial products to be
personalized and customized to the
indivrdual needs of corporate and retail
clients is the order of the day. Financial

4t
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institutions would, therefore, need to

be more proactive and innovative in
packaging and marketing their
products. Furthermore, in the new
financial environment, the need to
ensure adequate and effective
consumer education and protection
has also become even more
compelling and challenging so as to
prevent any disruption in the level or
reliability of services to customers and
their protection from potential unfair
practices.

Functional Specialization
The . intense competition among
financial institutions call for the
management of the country's banks to
re-examine their existing business
models to see where their strengths
lie and to what opportunities these
strengths could be applied to enhance
returns. There may be the need to
move towards strategic differentiation

among the fihancial institutions in
order to better serve the relevant

supervision, international financial
reporting standards, and common
accounting year end, among others,
would be beneficial to the industry
and, the country, at large.
I

m

proved regu atory Framework
I

One big lesson for the regulatory
authorities in the financial services
industry in Nigeria would be further
streamlining of their regulatory
framework as well as strengthening of
their supervisory capacity to ensure
stability in the industry. ln this regard,
there would be need to properly

monitor the activities and
performance of the financial
institutions

to

prevent frequent

distress and failures in the system.

LegalReforms
Another lesson is the need to review
the existing rules and laws relevant to
the financial industry in Nigeria in line
with the new financial environment
and international best practice. ln the

or

wake of growth in the volume and
complexity of financial transactions
involving both local and foreign
investors in the post-reform era, the

management,

challenge is to ensure the cooperation

market segment or niches. This may

involve market or functional

specialization

as institutions

combinations

of risk

decide

which functional areas

customer services, product
innovations, to exploit and maximize
to their advantage thereby buttressing

the new blue print of the

CBN

(specialized banking) for the banking
sector.

Building Capacity in the Sector
The evolving competitive financial
environment require highly skilled
workforce that would effectively

of both the legislature and the
judiciary to work closely in the
enforcement of the existing laws
relating to the financial system in
order to engender confidence in the
system. There is a compelling need to
reform the laws that pertain to the
mortgage sector particularly the Land

Use Act. This requires the

strengthening

of the

primary

mortgage institutions and the review

contribute to value creation within the

of the relevant laws su-ch as the Land
Use Act. With respect to loan recovery

employee recruitment was merely to
comply with regulatory requirements,
while training was viewed as a nonrevenue function that was costly and
unnecessary. One thing that is key
today is the issue of the quality of

within the framework of the financial
services industry, there is need to

financial institutions. Hitherto,

establish special courts that will
handle cases of loan defaults, credit

development.

Sound Ethical Banking Practices

Strong good corporate governance
and risk management has become
key part of successful institutions in
the world today. Speciflcally, the
adoption of best practices such as
good corporate governance code,
risk-based supervision, consolidated

institution(s).

Security of life and property

With the renewed call for foreign
investment in the economy, the issue
security of life and property,

of

including property rights and rule of
law cannot be overemphasized.

is the need for improved
business environment in the country
in general in otherto sustain the gains

There

of the financial sector reforms

even gain more

for

and

improved

development of the economy.

8.0

The Way Forward

Maintaining

a safe and sound

banking sector is essential, given the
key role that banks play in promoting
the health of a country's overall
economy. Most countries do this by
some form of banking supervision,
generally accepting that the added

protection to the banking system in
the form of supervision is worth the
costs of the regulatory burden. One of
the ways that bank supervisors can
help promote a healthy banking
system is to focus banks on the
development of improved riskmanagement techniques. lndeed,
identifying, assessing, and promoting

sound risk-management practices
have become central elements of
good supervisory practice. Bankers
should therefore ensure that their
risk-management practices include a
focus on less likely outcomes, not just
the most common ones, and that the

bank is being adequately

compensated (provisioning) for the
risk it is bearing. The use of exercises

such as stress tests and scenario
analyses can help bankers identify
certain points of vulnerability that may
arise during potential downturns.

fraud and insider abuse related cases
promptly.

to strengthen banks'

Liquidation Process and Payment

requirements in order to ensure their
solvency. This is achieved via the

manpower. Real strategic change can

only take place with competent and
committed workforce that is
constantly exposed to training and

prolonged litigation by the

of Private Depositors
A major challenge in the liquidation of
the failed financial institutions in the
country is the prompt disposal of their
assets for the settlement of the
depositors. This calls for expedited
action on the operationalization of the

Assets Management Corporation

(AMNCO) as well as the revision of
the necessary laws that will make it
possible for both the CBN and NDIC
to liquidate failed institution(s) without
42

To arrest banking crisis, there is need

capital

purchasing by public authorities of

securities issued by banks or by
taking stakes, where necessary in
troubled banks. Banks will thus be
able to continue developing their
lending activities, by increases in their

if adverse market
conditions prevent them from raising
capital, even

funds on financial markets.

Another type of action consists of
ensuring the proper provision of
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liquidity to banks by the monetary
authorities so that they can continue to
finance the economy in the short- and

long-term. Central banks have
regularly adjusted their operational

frameworks in order to provide the
banking systems with all the liquidity
that they need: The discount window
operations was recently extended in
order to give renewed impetus to the
money market beyond the very short-

term segment. The money market
transaction thus was considerably
strengthened. The range of eligible
counterparties was extended to
enable the maximum diffusion of
liquidity in the system; the scope of
eligible collateral for refinancing was
enlarged to provide more flexible
access and make larger quantities
available; in the system the
refinancing potential of counterparties

was thus almost doubled;

th_e

refinancing procedures were also
radically modified: quaniities are no
longer limited and are agreed at a
fixed rate (instead of a system of
variable rates via auctions).

It has been noted that better risk
management and stronger financial
buffers alone cannot prevent higher-

boards of directors of banks should

establish and adopt prudent
standards for bank compensation
programs that require a significant
portion of bonuses to be paid in
shares that vest over time; link
bonuses to performance targets and
adherence to prudential principles;

management to take excegsive risks
and should be discouraged through
setting of limits of risk-taking. The
global financial crisis has
demonstrated that banks' excessive
risk taking can be catastrophic and
that there is no built-in safeguard to
constrain such risk taking. lt is
therefore imperative that regulatory
authorities should set percentage-of-

capital limits on banks' high-risk

activities. The adoption of such limits
is the only tangible way to reduce the
threat to the financial system.

\
One of the key board responsibilities
is to design compensation programs
that reward long-term performance
and promote sound risk management.
The recent financial crisis revealed
that bank compensation practices
encouraged excessive risk taking and
rewarded short-term profits at the

expense of long-term viability. To
address this deficiency, regulatory
authorities in collaboration with

perhaps more so during a crisis when
market participants and govemments
are sometimes trying to determine
where problems lie and how severe
they might be. Lack of information can

present additional problems during a

and permit bonuses only if

crisis, and incorrect

supervisors consider a bank's capital
ratios sufficient.

governments, and other institutions

Moreover, pursuing sound

macroeconomic policies is another
way for policymakers to help prevent

banking and financial crises. For
instance, it is beneficialto have sound
and sustainable monetary and fiscal
policy to provide a stable operating
environment for entrepreneurs and
financial institutions and markets.
Many past crises were precipitated
either by an external shock affecting
an already vulnerable financial sector
or by market participants targeting
vulnerabilities in certain markets or in
certain institutions or governments.

Experience has shown that

if

a

condition or policy looks

it is most likely that

or

incomplete

information provided by firms,

can severely undermine their

credibility, worsening the problem.
Transparency will assist banks to
make informed decisions; rescue

them from the illusion of high
performance; help to build both
customer and investor confidence;
provides opportunity for restrategizing; provide a competitive
advantage, clear understanding of the
risks and challenges faoing the bank.

There is need for a fonarard-looking
supervisory regime which would
ensure appropriate and sustained
capacity building initiatives.Also, bank

supervisors should keep abreast of

state-of-the

art practices

and

an end.

procedures in order to discharge their
functions efficiently, effectively and
creditably.

A major cause of distress in most

9.

unsustainable,

market forces will eventually bring it to

risk activity taking banks from causing

systemic crisis. Banks' quest for
maximum profit and shareholders
value leads to pressure on the bank

make informed decisions. This is of
course true during normal times, but

Nigerian banks has been attributed to
poor corporate governance. ln most
cases, members of management are

often self-serving and indulging

in

criminally irresponsible behaviour in

Concluding Remarks

The various episodes of financial
crises in the country have been
examined. We have also tried to
highlight the causes of the postconsolidation crisis in the Nigerian
banking sector. ln addition, some
resolution actions taken by the

the administration of their banks. This
suggests the need for an appropriate
mechanism to be put in place to
ensure that erring directors are
prosecuted on accelerated basis.

As a way forward,'some policy options

Furthermore, having

an open and
transparent financial system and
economy, accornpanied by reliable

including sound macroeconomic
policy, sound risk management
system and high levels of

and accurate accounting standards
would generally benefit a country and

transparency and disclosure, among

its

market participants.

A

core

principle of economics is that markets

are more competitive, and therefore
more efficient, when accurate
information is available to both
consumers and suppliers. lnformation

is thus critical to the effective
functioning of financial markets:
Timely and accurate financial

information about markets, market
participants, and governments is
important for all actors to be able to
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regulatory authorities were highlighted
as well as a few lessons of experience.

for a healthy banking

system,

others, were recommended.
As a final thought, there is no uniform
effects neither is there any single
remedy to each crisis, but each brings

its own surprises and risks. Clearly,
we should not assume that past
remedies will fully solve the cunent
and next set of problems or address all

future crises. The key

is to take

lessons from the past and tailor them

appropriately

to

address future

situations of potential crisis.
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